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BAR BRIEFS

boards, notwithstanding such a legislative pronouncement as this, for
example: "The bureau shall have full power and authority to hear
and determine all questions within its jurisdiction, and its decision
thereon shall be final."
We are among those who have insisted, continuously, and sometimes rather strenuously, that such provisions are uri-American, and
that there should be substituted a right of review and we favored
"review" rather than "appeal." But it has also been our contentionthe argument being thus far ineffective and uneffective-that administrative procedure may and should be so organized that administrative
action would be appealable under the foregoing provision as it now
stands. As a member of one of these bureaus, we hold it to be the duty
of such bureaus to use extraordinary legislative grants of power in such
a way that ultimate justice may be approximated, and are firmly convinced that if such power were so exercised there would be fewer requests that the judiciary "assume" jurisdiction or that the legislature
amend the law.
Of course, no wide-open policy should be inaugurated. There
must come a time in every case when the gate should be closed through
limitation provisions. But whenever and wherever reasonable and
reasoning men might differ, the gate should be left open as long as
fairminded application of common-sense practices will permit, under
the law. We believe it should be done; we think it can be done; we
hope it may be done before we retire as a member of one of such administrative bureaus.
It is our conviction that Section i8 of the Compensation Act, to
use that law again for an example, was inserted for the particular
purpose of doing the sort of justice that should be the aim of all rightminded men. That Section reads: "If the original claim for compensati6n has been made within the time specified in Section 15 the
bureau may, at any time, on its own motion or on application, review
the award, and, in accordance with the facts found on such review,
may end, diminish or increase the compensation previously awarded,
or, if compensation has been refused or discontinued, award compensation."
Having been authorized and empowered to make decisions that
are final, such bureaus ought to have the disposition to review their
own decisions, upon their ovn motion, and to frame their findings
and conclusions, originally and upon such review, in such a way that
an "appealable order or award" may be entered, especially whenever
the record discloses conflicting or incomplete facts-the ultimate .aim,
of course, always being a final equitable decision rather than arbitrary
or technical support of a previous "non-appealable order," which may
or may not be equitable.
Using their extraordinary grants of power in such a way, it is
our jndgment, ultimate justice will be more nearly approximated, and
there will be few, if any, requests that the judiciary "assume" jurisdiction or that the legislature amend the law.
JUDICIAL COMMENT ON EVIDENCE
Lawyers have certainly not come to agreement upon the advisability of restoring to trial judges the common law right of expressing
opinions on the weight of evidence and the credibility of witnesses
in jury cases while laymen and legislators .seem quite definitely :dis-
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posed to prevent such restoration. It is with the view, then, of more
definitely searching out the opinion of our own Bar that we offer the
following expressions from rather authoritative sources:
Professor Dicey, in his "Law of the Constitution," page 389, says.:
"Trial by jury is open to much criticism; a distinguished French
thinker may be right in holding that the hAbit of submitting difficult
problems of fact to the decision of twelve men of not more than
average intelligence will in the near future be considered an absurdity
as patent as ordeal by battle. Its success in England is wholly due to,
and is the most extraordinary sign of, popular confidence in the judicial bench. A judge is the colleague and readily accepted guide of
the jurors."
Senate Bill No. 1094, 70th Congress, offered by Senator Caraway, of. Arkansas, seeks to prevent federal judges from making such
comments, the Senator's argument being: That judicial comment on
evidence and the credibility of witnesses constitutes "a clear invasion
of the province of the jury and, therefore, a flagrant usurpation of
the prerogative of the jury to weigh the evidence;" and that it improperly influences the jury, the jurymen being inclined meekly and
blindly to accept the views indicated by the judge.
Chief Justice Taney, in Mitchell vs. Harmony, 13 Howard 115,
makes this terse comment: "Nor can it be objected to upon the ground
that the reasoning and opinion of the court upon the evidence may
have an undue and improper influence on the minds and judgment
of the jury. For an objection of that kind questions their intelligence
and independence, qualities which cannot be brought into doubt without taking from that tribunal the confidence and respect which so
justly belong to it, in questions of fact."
Justice Holmes, in Graham vs. U. S., 231 U. S. 474, also answers
the objection in these words: "Universal distrust creates universal incompetence. In the courts of the United States the judge and jury
are assumed to be competent to play the parts that have always
belonged to them in the country in which the modern jury trial had
its birth."
Dean Pound, in his "Spirit of the Common Law," also refers to
the subject, and says: "In particular it may be shown that legislation
restricting the charge of the court has grown out of the desire of eloquent counsel, of a type so dear to the pioneer community, to deprive not merely the trial judge but the law of all influence upon
trials and to leave everything to be disposed of on the arguments."
To the same point spoke Professor Sunderland before the American Bar Association meeting at Detroit in 1925: "A few weeks spent
in watching jury cases tried in England will convince one that the
summing up does more to secure a verdict on the merits than all the
rules of evidence which legal ingenuity has devised. . . . Naturally his presentation (the judge's) will have weight with the jury, as it
ought to have, for there can hardly be any doubt about the immense
value of a nonpartisan summary after counsel have urged their antithetical views upon the jury."
COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY ACTS
Two recent decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court bring out some
of the points of distinction between- compensation acts and the Federal
Employers' Liability Act.

